

NSA review  
completed

DRAFT

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/\_\_\_\_  
SECURITY POLICY CONCERNING TRAVEL AND ASSIGNMENT OF  
PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED  
INFORMATION<sup>1</sup>

(Effective )

1. General

Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 11905 and National Security Council Intelligence Directives, minimum security policy applicable to assignment and travel of US Government civilian and military personnel, government consultants and employees of government contractors who have, or who have had, access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) is hereby established.

2. Purpose

This policy is based upon the need to protect SCI from possible compromise resulting from the capture, interrogation, exploitation or entrapment of personnel (stipulated in paragraph 1 above) by hostile or unfriendly nations or groups.

<sup>1</sup> Existing directives, regulations (including pertinent provisions of the Communications Intelligence Security Regulations), agreements and such other references governing hazardous activities as defined herein shall be revised accordingly.

May be Downgraded to Unclassified  
When Removed from Appendix A.

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3. Definitions

a. Sensitive Compartmented Information. The term Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) includes all information and materials bearing special community controls indicating restricted handling within present and future community intelligence collection programs (and their end products) for which community systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established. The term does not include Restricted Data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

b. Hazardous Activities. Hazardous activities include, assignments or visits to, and travel through, nations listed in Appendix, hereto. Hazardous activities also include assignment or travel in combat zones or other areas where hostilities are taking place, duties behind hostile lines and duties or travel in isolated or exposed areas where individuals cannot reasonably be protected against hostile action.

c. Defensive Security Briefings. Defensive security briefings are formal advisories which alert personnel as to the potential for harassment, provocation or entrapment by local agencies/officials in designated areas of risk. These briefings are based on actual experience whenever feasible, and include information on courses

of action helpful in mitigating the adverse security and personal consequences of such acts.

d. Risk of Capture Briefings. Risk of capture briefings are formal advisories which alert personnel as to what may be expected in the way of attempts to force or trick them to divulge classified information if captured or detained and of suggested courses of action they should follow to avoid or limit such divulgence. These advisories include instructions/advice for advance preparation of innocuous, alternative explanations of duties and background.

e. Senior Intelligence Officers. Within the meaning of this policy directive, Senior Intelligence Officers (SIO) are those officials representing their individual departments and agencies on the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), including the Military Department Intelligence Chiefs.

#### 4. Policy

a. Unofficial Travel. ~~While US citizens are not restricted by US laws from traveling in foreign countries,~~ Persons granted authorization for access to certain categories of extremely sensitive information on foreign intelligence sources and methods of SCI incur a special security obligation and are to be alerted by their SIO to risks associated with unofficial visits to, or travel through, the countries listed in Appendix. The SIO concerned should:

advise that travel in the listed countries may result in the withdrawal of clearance for continued access to SCI for persons with specific and extensive knowledge of the following categories of extremely sensitive information on foreign intelligence sources and methods:

- Technological structure, function and techniques of sensitive intelligence collection or exploitation systems/ methods; or
- Designated system targets or sources; or
- Method and purpose of target selection; or
- Degree of success of collection or exploitation system/method; or
- Collection or exploitation system/method capabilities and vulnerabilities.<sup>2</sup>

b. All persons having access to SCI who plan unofficial travel to or through countries listed in Appendix must:

- (1) Give advance notice of such planned travel.
- (2) Obtain a defensive security briefing from a specified official before traveling to such countries.

<sup>2</sup> NSA does not agree with 4a and proposes alternate language in Attachment 1.

(3) Contact immediately the nearest United States consular, attache or Embassy official if they are detained or subjected to significant harassment or provocation while traveling.

(4) Report upon return from travel to their SIO any incidents of potential security concern which befell them.

(5) Be reminded annually of the foregoing obligations through security education programs.

c. Official Assignment/Travel. No person with access to SCI will be assigned to or directed to participate in hazardous activities until he has been afforded a defensive security briefing and/or risk of capture briefing as applicable.<sup>3</sup>

d. Individuals with Previous Access. Persons whose access to SCI is being terminated will be officially reminded of the risks associated with hazardous activities as defined herein and of their obligation to ensure continued protection of SCI.

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<sup>3</sup> Due consideration will be given to the relative protection enjoyed by US officials having diplomatic status.

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5. Responsibilities

a. The DCI will cause to be prepared and disseminated to the SIOs a list of countries identified as posing a security risk bearing on this policy (Appendix). The Security Committee will coordinate required support including source material concerning these risks.

b. SIOs will issue implementing directives concerning travel and assignment of personnel of their departments or agencies. Such directives will be consistent with the overall policy, definitions and criteria set forth herein and will provide for:

(1) Preparation and provision of defensive security briefings and/or risk of capture briefings to appropriate personnel of their departments/agencies as/when applicable.

(2) Institution of positive programs for the collection of information in reports obtained under the provisions of paragraph 4b(4) above and other means as feasible.

(3) Insuring that new information obtained by their departments or agencies on harassments or provocations, or on risk of capture situations, is provided to the DCI and to other interested NFIB agencies. (Where warranted by new information, changes to Appendix will be made. Recommendations with supporting justification may be made for either addition or deletion of countries.)

(DRAFT)

Director of Central Intelligence

DRAFT

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/\_\_\_

APPENDIX

COUNTRIES IN WHICH VISITS, TRAVEL AND ASSIGNMENT ARE  
CONSIDERED TO BE A HAZARDOUS ACTIVITY

25X1

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Date Impossible to Determine

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RECEIVED BY DIRNSA  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652  
EXEMPTED BY ( ) IN ( )  
ON ( )

Declassify on Notification by  
Originator DTIC 10-10-87[illegible]

- Knowledge of current value is detailed knowledge of the US intelligence capability and its degree of success with regard to one or more sources or disciplines gained as a regular recipient and/or user of intelligence product affecting a specific target or geographic area, or extensive knowledge of the US intelligence effort, including degree of success of collection systems or methods, technical material, processing techniques, magnitude of effort, sensitive security procedures, end product that would reveal source or methods, collection plans, and intelligence liaison and cooperation relationships. Recipients of intelligence product, not revealing any of the foregoing and indoctrinated persons whose duties are confined to administrative support, do not necessarily fall into this category.

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TO:		
ROOM NO		
REMARKS		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.		ON

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Security Policy Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel  
With Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information

FROM:

Alternate CIA Member  
DCI Security Committee

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

9-22-84

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. General Counsel  
7D07

2.   
6E-56

DDS&T

3.   
7E-44

DDI

4. C/Operations Staff, DDO  
2D48

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15.

Attached is a copy of the latest draft of the proposed DCID concerning travel restrictions for individuals with compartmented access. At this point it is being forwarded for consideration by NFIB. As noted in the attachment, NSA continues to feel that unofficial travel restrictions in almost all cases should be imposed on anyone with compartmented access. The Security Committee in consensus has rejected such an approach based on a lack of evidence that individuals with compartmented access have been any more the target of harrassment and provocation than individuals without such access. CIA practice in this area is consistent with the proposed version of the DCID.

May we have your concurrence or comments so that an Agency position at the NFIB can be developed.